The dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland: social sources of political influence in a mass-member organization, 1860-2001 by Kaufmann, Eric P.
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 





Kaufmann, Eric P. (2006).The dynamics of 
Orangeism in Scotland: social sources of political 
influence in a mass-member organization, 1860-
2001. Social Science History 30 (2) 263-292. 
 
 
This is an exact copy of a paper published in Social Science History (ISSN 
0145-5532). Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by 
other copyright holders. All persons downloading this information are 
expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by copyright. This 
document or any part thereof may not be reposted or reused without the 
explicit permission of the copyright holder. © 2006 by the Social Science 
History Association and Duke University Press. 
 
Citation for this copy: 
Kaufmann, Eric P. (2006).The dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland: social 
sources of political influence in a mass-member organization, 1860-2001. 





Citation as published:  
Kaufmann, Eric P. (2006).The dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland: social 
sources of political influence in a mass-member organization, 1860-2001. 




Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk
Eric Kaufmann 
The Dynamics of Orangeism in Scotland 
Social Sources of Political Influence in a 
Mass-Member Organization, 1860-2001 
Like other voluntary associations, fraternities such as the Orange Order underpin 
political cleavages. The membership dynamics behind such associations are less clear. 
Rival theories attribute membership fluctuations alternatively to changes in social capi- 
tal, economic structure, culture, or events. This article uses a pooled time-series cross- 
sectional model to evaluate competing hypotheses for the period since 1860. Results 
suggest that membership was linked to longer-term shzfts in ethnic boundaries rather 
than structural or social capital variables, with events playing an intermediate role. 
Scottish Protestant mobilization against Catholics was less important than Irish Prot- 
estant ethnicity, but both were key. Finally, the order has been numerically weaker 
than many believe; hence its inability-even during the apex of its influence- to shape 
Tory policy. 
"Bad Old Habits: Ancient Hatreds Die Slow," announced an Economist 
headline discussing Scottish sectarianism in the wake of another episode of 
violence between supporters of two Glasgow football clubs: the Catholic- 
affiliated Celtic and the Protestant-linked Rangers. Prosecutors in Scotland, 
the article noted, had been instructed to take into account whether the crime 
had a sectarian motive ("Bad Old Habits" 2002). The issue, claimed the 
noted Scottish Catholic composer James MacMillan, went far deeper. In a 
high-profile address at the 1999 Edinburgh International Festival, MacMil- 
lan charged his Protestant compatriots with "visceral anti-Catholicismv and 
claimed that bigotry was rife in Scottish society (Devine 2000: 125). 
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Protestant identity can refer to a purely religious (i.e., doctrinal) identity
or a more secular ethnic identity based on a community grounded in a myth of
common ancestry (Smith 1991: 21). The role of the mass-member fraternity
known as the Loyal Orange Institution (Orange Order), one of the principal
sociopolitical vessels of Protestant identity in Scotland, is central to the above
story, but little is known about its twentieth-century activities.The order was
founded by Protestants in 1795 in Northern Ireland as a response to the per-
ceived threat of a union between the Catholic ‘‘Defender’’ movement and the
liberal Protestant United Irishmen who favored Irish independence. Scottish
regiments were dispatched to Ireland soon after the uprising of the United
Irishmen in 1798, and some claim that they brought Orangeism back with
them (McCracken 2002). Hard times in Ireland and the emergence of greater
Glasgow as an entrepôt of empire in the nineteenth century attracted numer-
ous Irish emigrants to west central Scotland. Though many were Catholic,
a signiﬁcant minority were Protestant, and these Protestant migrants helped
spread Orangeism in Scotland (Collins 1991).
The absence of detailed membership data on the Scottish order has
meant that analysts have been unable to accurately gauge the strength of
Orangeism and test competing explanations for changes in its inﬂuence.
This article breaks new ground on both counts, providing the ﬁrst internal
source-based study of Scottish Orangeism and the only quantitative analysis
of the forces underlying Orangemembership and its electoral inﬂuence. In so
doing, it helps arbitrate between the claims of those who allege that Scotland
is, and has been, a sectarian society and those who contest this interpreta-
tion. In broader terms, this article reveals a great deal about the dynamics
of mass-member associations and their role in maintaining electoral cleavage
systems.
This article builds upon the historical newspaper-based literature but
attempts to chart major trends with greater precision and makes a more con-
certed attempt to evaluate the relative strength of competing explanations of
ﬂuctuations in Orange strength. This necessarily relies on high-quality sta-
tistical data, which have been made possible only by unprecedented access
to the records of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland.These provide a vir-
tually complete run of annual membership data, across lodge and county, for
the period 1860–2001.1
The article begins by presenting new data on Scottish Orange mem-
bership over place and time. This is followed by a pooled time-series cross-
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sectional (TSCS) regression ofmembership levels on census variables using a
‘‘hard’’ dataset restricted to census years.The hard dataset uses county mem-
bership ﬁgures only for census years, typically every 10 years, and is thus
a relatively small dataset. To provide a more robust picture of membership
patterns and to test for the role of annual events, we turn to an expanded
annual dataset containing more than 2,000 membership observations. Both
show that religio-ethnic factors are by far the most important predictors of
Orange membership levels. Finally, we consider whether Orange member-
ship strength has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the pre-1961 popular vote for the
central belt (county level) and Glasgow (ward level).
The literature on electoral cleavages recognizes the cardinal role of vol-
untary associations, such as churches or unions, in providing the institutional
skeleton for the maintenance of political cleavages—rendering them resistant
to the ‘‘normal’’ crosscutting pressures of pluralist politics (Dahl 1963: 106;
Lipset and Rokkan 1967). An inﬂuential recent text on this subject assesses
cleavages along the axes of ‘‘organizational density,’’ such as union mem-
bership levels and cultural heterogeneity (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 224–40).
These two axes are understandably dichotomized due to data limitations, but
organizational density is in fact a distinct institutional variable that can be
applied equally to the cultural or economic realms. For example, regardless
of how the census categorizes the population culturally, vibrant and politi-
cally engaged patriotic or religious associations will enhance the power of
ethnic or religious cleavages just as powerful unions can catalyze socioeco-
nomic diﬀerences.
Why cultural associations rise or fall is thus of great signiﬁcance. Pres-
sure groups are known for their short life cycles, while established associa-
tions with deep communal roots, such as churches, are far more enduring,
though often less politically active (Moran 1989).Though there is a growing
literature on new social movement and church membership dynamics, there
has been little quantitative research on patriotic or ethnonationalist organiza-
tions—many of which are politically inﬂuential. Robert D. Putnam’sBowling
Alone (2000) sketched some time-series patterns for certain American soci-
eties, but there has been no in-depth follow-up. Herewe consider the dynam-
ics of one such organization, the Orange Order, across space and time. In the
process, we will assess the theories of Putnam and others who have written
about the postindustrial decline of cultural associations.
Whereas SeymourM. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) stressed the post-
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1920s ‘‘freezing’’ of cleavages in Europe, more recent research in manyWest-
ern societies claims that established cleavages based on religion and class are
eroding due to modernizing or postmodernizing pressures. One variant of
this approach stresses the role of secularization and postindustrialization in
undermining class and religion-based networks (Heath et al. 1991; Barnes
1997; Bruce 2002). Another focuses on the post-1960s rise of a ‘‘new poli-
tics’’ value cleavage, which is linked to membership in a ‘‘postmaterialist’’
social category somewhat analogous to notions of a postindustrial New Class
(Bell 1980; Inglehart 1990). A ﬁnal strand of research emphasizes growing
voter individualism and cleavage decline. Thus recent large-scale electoral
research has demonstrated that social cleavages—apart from ‘‘left-right’’ ide-
ology—are a weak predictor of voting behavior in postindustrial democracies
(Norris 2004).
Ethnic or nationalist cleavages occupy a curious place in this literature.
On the one hand, ethnic cleavages comprise part of Lipset and Rokkan’s
scheme (i.e., the linguistic cleavage) that we supposedly have transcended.
On the other hand, we often ﬁnd ethnicity and nationalism classed as forces
that have contributed to a fracturing of established cleavages.The perception
of a radical shift from religion to ethnicity or nationalism is understandable.
Many separatist and far-right parties in the West gained political ground as
religious ones declined after the 1960s. Even so, the Orange Order, which is a
religio-ethnic organization, shows how an organization can span both ‘‘old’’
religious and ‘‘new’’ ethnic cleavages.
This ﬂags the importance of the continuities that link, for example, the
Catholic politics of pre–‘‘Quiet Revolution’’ French Canadians with con-
temporary linguistic Quebec nationalism or the older Protestant politics of
British-dominant ethnic groups with the white racial politics of some of
these groups today. Boundary symbols may have shifted from religion to lan-
guage or race, but the underlying ethnic nature of political cleavages remains.
Even if religion remains the major ethnic boundary, our ‘‘ethnic boundary’’
approach, which distinguishes between ethnicity and the boundary markers
that delineate it, allows us to explain why ethnic boundaries or cleavages
based on religion can harden in the face of secularization, as in Israel, Yugo-
slavia, or India (Barth 1969; Connor 1994; Chhibber 1999; Shamir and Arian
1999). Ethnic associations such as the Hindu Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,
the French Canadian Saint Jean-Baptiste Society, or the Afrikaner Broeder-
bond have been linked intimately with nationalist movements of both domi-
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nant and subaltern character. A general diminution in ethnic associational
activity therefore may have the eﬀect of dampening ethnic-nationalist cleav-
ages, a ﬁnding with profound consequences for the world’s many deeply
divided societies.
Putnam’s (2000) work has drawn attention to the role of voluntary orga-
nizations in creating social capital or bonds of interaction between disparate
individuals outside of their private, familial contexts. According to Putnam,
associations are major repositories of social capital, bringing individuals to-
gether and often drawing them into public life. Putnam distinguished be-
tween ‘‘bonding’’ social capital of the kind that can integrate ethnic groups
across lines of region or class and ‘‘bridging’’ social capital that unites groups
across ethnic or religious lines. Hadassah, the Knights of Columbus, and
the Masons are three associations that Putnam examined. These are clas-
sic ‘‘bonding’’ associations for, respectively, Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant
whites in the United States. Like the Masons, the Orange Order provides
an example of bonding social capital for Protestants. Putnam’s work used
an array of time-series data from many American voluntary associations to
sketch longer-term patterns in national connectedness. Putnam ascribed the
decline of many American associations in the post-1960s period to genera-
tional turnover and the rise of television.This trend has been paralleled by the
decline of ethnic, religious, and racial endogamy and the rise of hybridized
patterns of identiﬁcation (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Gans 1994; Putnam
2000).
But what exactly is the nature of the causal link here? Has a decline in
social capital led to ethnic and religious identity change, or can we instead
posit that religio-ethnic identities declined for their own substantive cultural
reasons, with the pattern of social interaction following rather than leading
developments? Those who argue in this manner, against social capital–type
explanations, tend to specify wide-ranging cultural changes, such as secular-
ization, or structural changes, such as deindustrialization, as well as contin-
gent factors, such as political events, including strikes, as key determinants
of change (Bruce 2002). These modernizing processes, it is claimed, tend
to break up the overlapping associational networks that entrench political
cleavages.
The case of the Orange Order in Scotland provides an interesting test
of current propositions in the literature on social capital and political cleav-
ages.This long-standing mass association has both religious and ethnic over-
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tones and a history of political activism and recently has experienced a mem-
bership decline whose trend exhibits both ‘‘modernizing’’ and Putnamesque
characteristics.
The Scottish Context
The Orange Order is a fraternity founded in the north of Ireland in 1795
whose constitution commits its members to the defense of Protestantism and
the British Crown and that has served as a major associational nexus for
Protestant-dominant ethnic groups in Scotland, Northern Ireland, north-
western England, and Canada. Its convivial and religious roles have been
matched by its political engagement. In the above locations, the order has
supplied numerous local, provincial, or national leaders and has attempted
to inﬂuence the course of government policy in a Unionist and Protestant
direction (Senior 1972; Houston and Smyth 1980; Waller 1981; Neal 1988;
Bryan 2000).
The order is at the center of the debate on sectarian conﬂict in Scot-
land. This issue takes on salience primarily in industrial central Scotland,
which attracted large-scale Irish immigration during the 1840–1920 period—
so much so that 35 to 40 percent of the population of the main west central
counties of Lanark and Renfrew is now of Irish Catholic origin (Dorling et al.
2001). It is less important in regions such as the Northeast or the Highlands,
where the smaller Catholic population is largely of Scottish ethnicity (Brown
1997: 52–53). This suggests that where religion serves as an ethnic boundary
marker, as with the Irish Catholic–Scottish Protestant antinomy in central
Scotland, it takes on greater political salience.
Several important political and social histories produced in the 1980s
helped shed light on Catholic-Protestant conﬂict in Scotland (Bruce 1985;
Gallagher 1987a, 1987b). Recently, the debate has taken more concrete shape.
One school of thought holds that sectarianism is still a prominent inﬂuence
in Scottish society, though it has been translated to new realms. It points
to the persistence of a religious electoral cleavage and diﬀerences in eco-
nomic performance between Lowland Protestants and Catholics as evidence
of this. Proponents of this view also cite the widespread Protestant desire for
the abolition of Catholic separate schools and the large-scale public displays
of antagonism that accompany both Rangers-Celtic matches and Orange
marches (Brown et al. 1999; Reilly 2000; Williams and Walls 2000).
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The countervailing position contends that while sectarianism was an
important feature of the Scottish landscape in the past, its inﬂuence has
declinedmarkedly since the SecondWorldWar and especially since the 1960s
and was never as considerable as is popularly believed, especially in com-
parison with other largely Protestant nations.The reduction of disparities in
educational and economic performance, increasing intermarriage rates, and
converging responses to surveys of attitudes and voting intentions are cited in
support of this position (Rosie and McCrone 2000; Rosie 2001, 2004; Bruce
et al. 2004).
The literature on Scottish Orangeism conforms somewhat to this pat-
tern. Elaine McFarland stresses the Irish Protestant, working-class, immi-
grant basis of Scottish Orangeism. This suggests that Orangeism was an
import that failed to capture the imagination of native Scots, who were more
inclined toward socialism or ‘‘liberal common sense’’ (McFarland 1990).
In considering the interwar period, Graham Walker reiterates McFarland’s
claim that the order was principally an Irish Protestant ethnic association.
He suggests that the order was ‘‘maintained in the early decades of the twen-
tieth [century] by immigrants and their Scottish-born descendants’’ (Walker
1992: 178).
This did not render the order politically impotent, however. Walker
maintains that the political turbulence of the interwar period led to a surge in
Orange membership, a broader Scottish appeal, and enhanced political activ-
ism. As evidence, he points to the sweeping success of Orange candidates in
the 1919 Glasgow school board elections and notes the presence of a consider-
able number of Orange members of Parliament in the twenties and thirties
(ibid.: 187–89). Steve Bruce (1985: 167) adds that the order helped deliver the
Protestant working-class vote in west central constituencies until the 1950s.
Iain McLean (1983: 200–201) disagrees, however: he contends that even in
the turbulent 1918–22 period Orangemen were less likely than Catholics to
vote as a bloc and failed to aﬀect Labour in any major electoral contest.
In terms of membership dynamics,Walker notes that Irish immigration
slowed considerably between the wars but did not aﬀect Orange member-
ship. Rather, he suggests that events kept membership buoyant. His account
ﬁnds some resonance in the works of Bruce and McFarland as well as other
political historians of the order who emphasize the role of events (Gallagher
1987a: 293–95; McCracken 1990: 35; Marshall 1996: 105). Others point to
the importance of class structure in reinforcing sectarian division, with the
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Orange Order viewed as a means for Protestant-dominated manufacturing
interests to divide or control the working class (McFarland 1990: 19–22;
Bryan 2000: 20). For the more recent period, Bruce suggests that slum clear-
ance has beenmore of a factor than declining religiosity in the order’s decline.
He notes that the relatively small proportion of Catholics in Scotland, com-
pared to Ulster, has always limited the appeal of militant Protestant move-
ments (Bruce 1985: 167, 246; 1998: 111).
Membership Trends
Let us begin by considering the long-term trend in Scottish male Orange
membership, expressed as a ratio per thousandmales. For conﬁdentiality rea-
sons, actual membership ﬁgures cannot be displayed, but the general trend
is clear.2 Membership increases occurred in the periods 1863–77, 1902–9,
1919–26, 1941–53, and 1961–79. Notable declines took place during 1878–
1900, 1913–18, 1927–41, and 1987–present. Spikes in membership of over 20
percent took place during 1864, 1865, 1903, 1920, and 1933. Collapses of over
20 percent occurred during 1885 and 1934 (see ﬁgure 1).
In explaining patterns such as these, it is tempting to jump immedi-
ately to event-driven explanations. However, while certain historical junc-
tures appear to be relevant, we also need to be cognizant of the many events
that seem to have had a surprisingly limited eﬀect, such as the Great Depres-
sion, the Home Rule crises of 1884–86 and 1916–22, or the Northern Ireland
‘‘Troubles’’ of 1969–72. Appearances can be deceiving, though, since events
can counteract each other’s inﬂuence and mask underlying social trends.We
therefore need to contextualize these patterns against a background of both
internal developments, such as dues increases, and broader social, demo-
graphic, and economic changes in order to assess the true predictive power
of these events.
A further dimension to this study is geographic. Figures 2 and 3 map
Scottish Orange lodges in 2001, with points adjusted for size of lodge mem-
bership. This is framed by pre-1973 Scottish county boundaries. Notice the
concentration of membership on the west coast of central Scotland around
Glasgow and North Lanarkshire, with spillover into adjacent counties, no-
tably West Lothian, the highest per capita concentration of current mem-
bership, Renfrewshire, and Ayrshire. This is explained partly by population
distribution, given the primacy of Glasgow and the surrounding Clydeside
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Figure 1 Orange membership, Scotland, per 1,000 males
Sources: Census of Scotland 2001; Kaufmann 2004.
conurbation as the largest Scottish metropolitan area. Yet the paucity of
lodges in both the Highlands and the Borders regions and in populous Edin-
burgh, Dundee, and Aberdeen is striking.
This pattern has held for a considerable period of time. Though there
was a slightly more numerous Orange presence in Wigtownshire and Dun-
dee in the mid–nineteenth century, the principal Clydeside and west central
counties have dominated Orangeism from the outset. Despite some ﬂuctua-
tion—notably the rise and decline of Glasgow as population moved in and
then out during the twentieth century—the geographic proﬁle of the order
has not changed dramatically in a century and a half.
The Freemasons make for a useful contrast. The ritual, symbolism,
degree structure, and organization of Masonry are virtually identical to those
of Orangeism. Indeed, Orangeism explicitly drew upon Masonic models for
inspiration. Given a native Scots tradition of Masonry that goes back to the
late ﬁfteenth century, it is unsurprising that this fraternity has done so well
among Scottish Protestants. In fact, Scotland’s total of some 150,000Masons
gives this nation the highest rate of Masonic membership in the world (Bes-
sel 2002). The Masons also have served as one of the institutional vessels of
both Scottish and popular Protestant identity (Finn 1990).
However, while Freemasonry has been associated with Protestantism in
most English-speaking societies, its identity as an avowedly apolitical and
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Figure 2 Distribution of Scottish Orange lodges, 2001
Source: Kaufmann 2004. Digital boundaries courtesy of EDINA/UK Borders, edina.ac.uk/ukborders.
nonreligious organization makes it a less convenient vehicle than Orangeism
for Protestant or Loyalist identity. Here it is instructive to note the contrast-
ing geography of Masonic lodges vis-à-vis their Orange counterparts (see
ﬁgure 4).3Notice Masonry’s more even lodge distribution—this maps much
more neatly onto the broader Protestant population of Scotland as a whole:
Clydeside is themajor concentration, but lodges cover the Borders, theHigh-
lands, and the Northeast, with secondary concentrations in Edinburgh, Dun-
dee, and Aberdeen.Whereas nearly two-thirds of Orangemen live inGlasgow
or Lanarkshire, fewer than a quarter of Scottish Masons do.
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Figure 3 Distribution of Scottish Orange lodges, by county, central Scotland, 2001
Source: Kaufmann 2004. Digital boundaries courtesy of EDINA/UK Borders, edina.ac.uk/ukborders.
International Dimensions
It is very often forgotten that Orangeism was and is a worldwide fraternity
and at one time could be found throughout the British Empire. English-
speaking Canada, not Ireland, has been the leading Orange jurisdiction, with
Scotland, England, Australasia, and the United States occupying a much
smaller position within the organization.Oneway of examining the impact of
Orangeism in a particular location is membership density. Orange male mem-
bership density (OMD) is calculated as the number of Orange male members
per target population of adult male British Protestants. In these terms, the
Scottish OMD generally has been little more than 1 percent and averaged
barely 2 percent in its Clydeside heartland during its membership peak. Even
in its highest concentrations (Govan and Rutherglen in the greater Glas-
gow area), Scottish OMD rarely exceeded 10 percent. Compare this with the
Canadian province of Newfoundland and the Irish counties of Fermanagh,
Monaghan, andTyrone, all of which hadOMDs of roughly one-third in 1920,
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Figure 4 Distribution of Scottish Masonic lodges, by county, 2001
Source: Ancient and Free Accepted Masons, Grand Lodge of Scotland 2001. Digital boundaries courtesy
of EDINA/UK Borders, edina.ac.uk/ukborders.
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or at the lower end, the Canadian province of Ontario and the Northern Irish
city of Belfast, whose OMDs were around 10 percent in 1920.4
Data and Methods
This article seeks to track membership dynamics in both their temporal and
their spatial dimensions. Orange membership has been computed from the
annual reports of the Grand Lodge of Scotland. Independent variables are
drawn from decennial Scottish censuses, the annual reports of the Scottish
registrar-general, and electoral data.5 Variables include, among others, popu-
lation density and growth rate; proportions in agriculture, manufacturing,
and the professions; infant mortality rate; proportions Catholic and non–
Church of Scotland Protestant; and Irish-born population. Variables are all
expressed as a proportion of county population (Glasgow is subsumed under
the Lanark totals).Geographic adjustments have beenmade in order to estab-
lish a continuous dataset for the 1961–91 period, but 2001 data cannot be
interpolated in this manner.6
Due to the nature of the available data, this is an ecological rather than an
individual-level analysis, based on Scottish pre-1973 counties.The validity of
this kind of model has been established in the methodological literature and
holds well in this case as the unspeciﬁed characteristics of counties, unlike
those of neighborhoods, are almost certainly too diﬀuse to decisively aﬀect
our dependent variable. Though it may be stretching the point to assert,
as some have, that the ‘‘ecological fallacy is a fallacy itself,’’ there is little
doubt that a well-speciﬁed model and appropriate geographic units can allow
for a causal analysis that compares favorably to, or in some cases surpasses,
individual-level analyses (Firebaugh 1978; King 1997; Jargowsky 2004).
The shape of our data also inclines us toward TSCS pooling using panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE). This technique allows us to surmount a
number of important problems encountered by researchers using ordinary
least squares or generalized least squares (GLS) techniques (Beck and Katz
1995). Beyond its much contested utility for dealing with the small-N prob-
lem, it allows us to make a claim regarding the global relationship between
our dependent and independent variables (Kittel 2001).
This is not to dismiss some of the serious pitfalls of pooled models,
notably their more complex error structure and their assumption that a global
relationship between two variables is possible. For instance, a number of
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authors have shown that the relationship that holds between variables in time
does not obtain across place. These authors remark that pooled models tend
to provide an ‘‘average’’ of pooled cross-sections (i.e., ‘‘between’’ variation)
and pooled time series (i.e., ‘‘within’’ variation).Thus the universal beta that
is obtained actually may bear little relationship to either the ‘‘real’’ pooled
time-series or pooled cross-sectional relationships, thereby obscuring both
(Firebaugh 1980; Smith 1995).
Moreover, in political science, variation between units such as congres-
sional districts or nations is generally much greater than the variation over
time within a unit. Relevant independent variables thus change more slowly
than in economic analyses and often have a historical-institutional origin
(Smith 1995; Kittel 2001: 233). This pattern is certainly evident in our data:
the variation across Scottish counties provides a much sharper contrast than
the ebb and ﬂow of membership over time within them. Hence we need to
be cognizant that many of our key variables involve slowly changing cross-
sectional processes, and cross-county trends will tend to dominate our model
andmay owe their origin to unspeciﬁed historical developments that antedate
our dataset.
All of this should serve to remind us that county and year intercepts
in our data are not merely ‘‘noise’’ to be corrected but provide important
information about the nature of the relationship between census variables,
Orange membership, and particular voting patterns. To be sensitive to these
nuances, we compare our pooled results with a time-series model as well as
with distinct pooled cross-sectional and pooled time-series models. In addi-
tion, datasets are by nature bounded in space and time, and thus there is
always a danger that our ﬁndings are conditional on the particular slice of
space-time we are observing (Kittel 2001: 239–42). To provide some safe-
guard against this, we will examine distinct time segments and subgroups
of counties to see whether key propositions obtain within subsamples of the
dataset.
Results
We begin with a pooled TSCS model using census and electoral data based
on 15 counties and 14 census years.7To incorporate event data and utilize the
full range of Orange membership data (15 counties × 142 years), we progress
to a model based on estimated intercensal data.8 Moving to the ﬁrst (15 ×
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14) dataset, results of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (Breusch-Pagan
LM) and Wald tests on GLS models were signiﬁcant, demonstrating both
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation in the data.9
Arthur L. Stinchcombe (1968) notes that institutions tend to replicate
themselves, thus generating numerous eﬀects that feed back into a complex,
self-replicating causal structure.Thus the eﬀects of a particular phenomenon
become its causes, leading to path dependency through time. For instance,
the Orange Order’s existing membership level to a large extent will condition
its ability to attract new members through interpersonal contact as well as
through ﬁnancially taxing events, the Orange Torch newsletter, social clubs,
and other activities. Results of Durbin’s M-test conﬁrm that this serial auto-
correlation is present even with decennial membership data.10 To correct for
this error structure, we employ Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz’s (1995)
PCSE model with Prais-Winsten transformation.
We test down across all available demographic, cultural, and economic
variables from the 1861–1991 period.Variables are limited to those that span
the entire 1861–1991 period as part of either the census or the registrar-
general’s series. The following variables were tested down for signiﬁcance:
(1) demographic—population growth, population, sex ratio, population den-
sity, marriage rate, birthrate, infant mortality rate; (2) cultural—religiosity
(measured by religious marriages as a percentage of total marriages), Church
of Scotland, Roman Catholic, ‘‘nonconformist’’ (all who are not members
of the Church of Scotland or Roman Catholic Church), and Irish-born;
and (3) economic—proportions in the agricultural sector, professions, and
manufacturing.
In addition, we test for the predictive power of the Irish-born population
at various ﬁxed dates (1851, 1901, and 1921). Since the Irish-born popula-
tion includes both Protestants and Catholics, this ﬁgure allows us to gauge
the degree to which Orangeism represents an Irish cultural imprint inde-
pendent of the Catholic-Protestant population balance. On the other hand,
if the proportion of Irish-born is not signiﬁcant but the Catholic proportion
of the population is, this suggests that we are observing a Scottish Protes-
tant sectarian response to a Catholic presence.The use of ﬁxed dates for the
Irish-born variable is necessary due to the steady decline in the rate of Irish
immigration after 1851.
We also attempt to weigh the importance of the Irish Protestant ethnic
element by examining the ratio between the proportion Irish-born and the
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Table 1 Time-series cross-sectional regression of male Orange density on census
variables, 1861–1991 (census years only)
Model  transformed Model  transformed
PCSE (core counties only, PCSE (all counties,
excludes zero cases) includes zero cases)




indicator ( basis) (	.	
) (.)












Model R 2 .		
 .	

*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
proportion Catholic at various dates (1901 was used for this model), a method
used byWalker (1991). If this ratio exceeds 1, for instance, there are likely to
be more Irish-born who are not Catholic than if the number is less than 1.
Whenmultiplied by the Irish-born population of 1901, this provides an inter-
action term that measures the impact of the Irish Protestant population in the
absence of direct data.This interaction term can be expressed as follows: Irish
Protestant Ethnic Groupt = (Irish-bornt / Roman Catholic populationt)
* Irish-bornt , where t = 1901. This variable thereby arrays cases between,
on the one hand, counties such as Argyllshire or Aberdeenshire, with large
native Scottish Catholic populations but few Irish descendants, and, on the
other hand, counties such as Wigtownshire or Ayrshire, with large propor-
tions of Irish immigrants but relatively low Catholic populations. Given our
focus on the central belt, the former eﬀect is not likely to inﬂuence our sample
greatly.
The results obtained from this dataset are presented in table 1, with vari-
ables ranked in order of signiﬁcance as measured by z-score.The ﬁrst model
includes only ‘‘core’’ counties—all counties except for the four counties
in which membership is generally zero (Aberdeenshire, Argyllshire, Clack-
mannanshire, and Perthshire)—and also excludes years in the core counties
in which there is no Orange membership. The second model includes all
counties (15 × 14).
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These results suggest that the Scottish counties with highermaleOrange
Order membership rates tend to be those that have a high Irish Protes-
tant population and a high Roman Catholic population. On the one hand,
repeated modeling indicates that the most durable variable of signiﬁcance
is the proportion Roman Catholic. It is, for example, the only variable that
strongly predicts across both place and time. It is likewise the only variable
that can signiﬁcantly predict both short-run changes in Orange membership
density using a ﬁrst-diﬀerences PCSEmodel and the mean Orange member-
ship density across all models. Fixing a Roman Catholic cross-sectional vari-
able for diﬀerent base years provides a good predictor of the dependent vari-
able. However, even when ﬁxed at early years, such as 1851 or 1901, Roman
Catholic population is not as strong a predictor as variables that directly tap
the Irish-born or Irish Protestant population.
Cross-sections using our Irish Protestant measure are signiﬁcant from
1851 to 1921 but not thereafter.This reﬂects the fading inﬂuence of the ﬁrst-
generation Irish Protestant population over the order in Scotland as it assimi-
lated into the Scottish Protestant mainstream. Unsurprisingly our model
works nearly as well when substituting time-ﬁxed Irish-born for Irish Prot-
estant population. More to the point, the high degree of multicollinearity
between variables tapping Irish-born, Catholic, and Irish Protestant dimen-
sions at ﬁxed years—especially prior to 1931—renders problematic any neat
attempt to disentangle ethnic (Irish Protestant), cultural (Irish), or sectar-
ian (anti-Catholic) eﬀects. The average interitem correlation between Irish
Protestant ethnicity and Roman Catholicism in 1901, for example, is .75,
and between Irish Protestant and Irish-born it is as high as .92.William H.
Greene (2003: 57) remarks that when independent variables are strongly cor-
related, unstable coeﬃcients can result from even small changes in the data-
set. Therefore the most we can say is that the Irish Protestant eﬀect seems
more potent prior to 1931.
In contrast to the time-invariant Irish Protestant variable, the propor-
tion of contemporary Irish-born—which varies over time as well as place—
is not signiﬁcant in the above models, even when restricting the time period
to the nineteenth century. These trends likely reﬂect an Irish-born popu-
lation that is everywhere in rapid decline over the span of our dataset, no
matter what the trajectory of Orange membership. More agricultural coun-
ties are associated with lower Orange membership, though this eﬀect is not
as consistently strong as that obtained for the Roman Catholic predictor in
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repeated testing. Moreover, the agricultural variable attains signiﬁcance only
if the dataset includes data prior to 1891. This likely reﬂects an agricultural
decline that becomes less important in the twentieth century.
Therefore one of the clearest ﬁndings that emerges from this model
is the importance of religio-ethnic variables in our analysis as evidenced
by the correlation between Orange membership density and the propor-
tions of Irish Protestant ethnicity and Catholic religion.The purely religious
angle is not so vital: witness the insigniﬁcance of Protestant denomination
(i.e., Church of Scotland versus nonconformist) and religiosity in the analy-
sis, thereby broadly conﬁrming Joseph M. Bradley’s (1995: 83, 95) survey
evidence, which shows that 27 percent of Scottish Orangemen belong to
churches other than the Church of Scotland, while many are not regular
churchgoers.
In contrast, sociodemographic and economic factors, such as popula-
tion density, infant mortality, illiteracy, and proportion in manufacturing,
are insigniﬁcant, casting some doubt upon theories that link the spread of
Orangeism to a ‘‘labor aristocracy’’ in growing industries, such as shipping
or textiles. Factors (rotated principal components) designed to simplify the
full range of structural variables also were tested, with similar results.
Putnam’s (2000) theory suggests that the generation born between 1910
and 1940 is far more likely to join associations than cohorts born earlier or
later and adds that increased levels of television viewing since the late 1960s
have enhanced associational decline. However, tests of Putnam’s generational
hypothesis of post-1960s fraternal decline using 30-year cohorts, including
the famous 1910–40 generation of ‘‘joiners,’’ proved insigniﬁcant, though the
limited set of post-1970 cases and the lack of data on television penetration
make it diﬃcult to decisively reject his hypothesis for the Orange association.
Thus far results have been obtained across a relatively small set of data,
and we have yet to test for the relative importance of political events. To
improve the eﬀectiveness of a TSCS strategy and test for the role of events,
we now move to a full, annualized dataset of Orange Order membership.
This comprehensive set of data allows us to examine the impact of annual or
multiyear events. However, such an exercise requires intercensal estimates of
census variables.11
Generally speaking, major membership changes do not correspond very
well to key historical events. Only in the case of the membership collapse of
1884–85 dowe gain some clue from printed sources.McFarland (1990) writes
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that some in the Govan area of South Glasgow complained of the impact of
‘‘dull trade’’ on the membership during this period, though it must be asked
why this recession could have such a decisive impact as compared with the
Great Depression. Another possible explanation is that the extension of vot-
ing rights to rural Scots (1884–85) obviated the need for participation in a
political vehicle such as the order. However, any explanation focused on the
extension of voting rights to rural Scots must explain why the membership
falloﬀ in a large city like Glasgow, where residents already could vote, was as
severe as in rural areas and why the more signiﬁcant 1918 franchise extension
had no similar eﬀect. Otherwise there is no obvious reason for the Orange
membership collapse of 1934 or the spikes of 1864, 1865, 1903, 1920, and 1933.
One way of surmounting the problem is to test for the role of broad
categories of events.We tested for several types of amalgamated event using
dummy variables for (1) threats to Protestantism or the Union; (2) Protestant
policy victories; (3) Protestant policy losses; (4) social or political stimuli; and
(5) wartime.12 All but policy victories were signiﬁcant in at least some of the
models.We also tested for the impact of economic recessions, dues increases,
and leadership changes—none of which proved signiﬁcant. Results appear in
table 2, with variables arrayed ﬁrst by functional type (socioeconomic versus
event) and then by signiﬁcance (z-score). Results for insigniﬁcant variables
are not displayed because excess variables were removed from the analysis
along lines suggested by Christopher F. Achen (2002). In addition to the core
county (i.e., counties with some Orange membership in most years) and all-
inclusive models used with the smaller dataset, we are now able to employ a
model that includes all nonzero cases due to more extensive data.
In comparing the full dataset (15 × 142) in table 2 to the hard dataset (15
× 14) we visited earlier in table 1, the ﬁrst pattern to notice is the great simi-
larity between the two.The Irish Protestant and Roman Catholic proportions
of the population (top two rows in all models) are still the most important
underlying determinants of Orange strength. In all three models that use the
new expanded dataset, these variables are signiﬁcant at the p < .01 level.
Agricultural occupation (row 3 in all models) emerges as signiﬁcant in
two of three models and remains weaker than the religio-ethnic variables.
Other structural variables, such as occupation or population density (omit-
ted from the tables), were not signiﬁcant. The diﬀerences between models
contained here and in the ﬁrst, hard dataset in table 1 are not great, despite
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two of the models (though this is picked up by our census estimation con-
trol dummy variable).13 On the whole, therefore, results reinforce our earlier
conclusions regarding the primacy of religio-ethnic variables over structural
or purely religious ones.
The role of events needs to be considered, however.Wartime is the most
important event variable, but policy losses, threatening events, and socio-
political stimuli are all quite signiﬁcant apart from the all-inclusive model,
where the high proportion of zero values dampens period eﬀects.The exigen-
cies of war, notably a high Orange enlistment rate, and policy losses tend to
lower Orange membership, whereas political threats and stimuli from socio-
political actors, such as the ﬁrebrand preacher GeorgeWise or the Protestant
political parties of John Cormack and Alexander Ratcliﬀe, tend to increase
membership. By and large, all of these variables display eﬀects that areweaker
than that of Irish Protestant ethnicity but stronger than that of the Catholic
proportion of the population. One-year lags of the ﬁve event variables listed
above proved insigniﬁcant. Among the more important individual events
were the two Church of Scotland–related crises (1868–69, 1962), the Boer
War,World War I, and the ﬁrst Home Rule crisis (1884–86).
On this evidence, we can conclude that events occupy a middle causal
ground between religio-ethnic factors and structural factors in explaining
Orange membership dynamics. Events are important in predicting mean
Orange membership, but tests using a ﬁrst-diﬀerences PCSE model show
that events cannot predict short-run changes in membership. This accords
with the unexplained nature of membership peaks and troughs. As a result,
we can see that, contrary to widespread belief both inside and outside the
organization, events alone cannot predict the course of Orange member-
ship—even over time.
Given our earlier comments regarding the diﬀerence between pooled
cross-sectional and pooled time-series models, it is incumbent upon us to
note how our conclusions apply diﬀerently when examining each dimension.
To begin with, our Irish Protestant variable is time-invariant, and events are
place-invariant.14 This adds an additional complicating factor to the prob-
lems noted earlier in the methods section with respect to interpreting pooled
models (Kittel 2001). A clearer picture emerges when we contrast ﬁxed-
(within-) eﬀects and between-eﬀects models.
Overall, the between component of ourmodel’sR2 is some ﬁve times that
of the within component, suggesting that cross-sectional eﬀects are provid-
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ing much of the power in our model. In the pure within-eﬀects (time-series)
model, we discard the time-invariant Irish Protestant 1901 variable, and both
proportion Roman Catholic, which, in the absence of Irish Protestant 1901,
reﬂects both Irish Catholic and Irish Protestant populations, and wartime
become the most important predictors. Structural factors seem to take on
greater weight: the proportion in agriculture is more important than in the
pooled TSCS case, and there is some evidence that variables associated with
youth and poverty are inversely correlated with Orange membership, though
this may be a spurious result.
In a time-series exercisewherewe considered the total Scottishmember-
ship against an annual time series of registrar-general’s statistics using some
socioeconomic demographic data, such as age structure, death rates, and
birthrates, ﬁrst-diﬀerences models showed both proportion Roman Catho-
lic and the male death rate, themselves inversely related, to be predictors
of the annual rate of change in Orange density. So it may be the case that
structural factors gain greater signiﬁcance across time. But the proportion
in agriculture is still less important than proportion Roman Catholic. More-
over, in contrast to thewithin-eﬀects model, the pure between-eﬀects (cross-
county) model automatically excludes the role of events and privileges ﬁxed
diﬀerences in the Irish Protestant estimated population and the Roman
Catholic population across county. All other cross-sectional variables appear
insigniﬁcant.
The Orange Impact on Politics
in Central Scotland
If religio-ethnic variables do much of the work of predicting Orange mem-
bership, especially over place, what can our model tell us about the so-called
Orange vote, viewed by some as a bulwark of Tory support among the nor-
mally Labour- or Liberal-supporting working classes (Bruce 1985; Gallagher
1987a: 144)? Tests using our hard dataset reveal that the proportions agri-
cultural, middle class, Church of Scotland, and Irish-born are important in
predicting the Tory vote in the period 1861–1961. This echoes established
ﬁndings pertaining to the importance of the religious cleavage for the Tory
vote in Britain during much of this period (Budge and O’Leary 1973; Wald
1983).Orange Order density, by contrast, is an insigniﬁcant predictor of either
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the Tory, Liberal, or Labour share of the vote in the central-belt counties
with which we are dealing.
A closer look at Glasgow is important, as it was and is very much the
hub of Orangeism. Several Glasgow wards, especially those bordering the
river Clyde, have male Orange densities that exceed those of any county.
Springburn, Govan, and, to a lesser degree, Cowcaddens and Pollokshaws,
for example, often had male membership densities in the 5–15 percent range
during the 1920–65 period.15 In Glasgow the Orange Order has had perhaps
its greatest impact on municipal politics and attained an important degree
of inﬂuence on the Tory Party between the wars (Gallagher 1987a: 144–45;
Walker 1992). However, using ward-level data across a limited range of census
and electoral variables collected by IainMcLean and J. C.Gordon (1978) in a
study of the Glasgow Labor movement during 1922–47 (N = 680), we found
no signiﬁcant relationship between Orange membership density and the vote
for either Labour or even the militant Scottish Protestant League (SPL).
Several commentators have pointed to friction between Ratcliﬀe’s SPL and
the Orange Order, noting that the order distrusted the street politics of Rat-
cliﬀe. This analysis supports such a claim (Gallagher 1987a; McCracken
2002). Overall, given Orangeism’s limited impact on the vote at both the
county and the city levels, it seems that the puzzle of Orange political impo-
tence needs to be qualiﬁed: Orangeism seems to have punched considerably
above, rather than below, its electoral weight in the political arena.
Conclusion
This article began by noting the importance of stable mass-member associa-
tions in maintaining cultural cleavages and the paucity of research into the
membership dynamics of these—especially in the ethnic-nationalist realm.
Examining one such association in TSCS detail reveals that slow-moving
cultural patterns are more powerful than structural or social-capital mecha-
nisms in explaining membership change.
Orangeism in Scotland is a religio-ethnic fraternity principally conﬁned
to the central belt. It has been signiﬁcantly weaker—even in its west cen-
tral heartland—than in comparable Orange settings, such as Northern Ire-
land or Canada. Nonetheless, the Scottish organization’s membership was
the last to peak, doing so only in the 1980s, having weathered the storm
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of modernization for longer than its counterparts in other locations. The
most signiﬁcant long-term predictors of male Orangeism’s strength as a pro-
portion of the Protestant population are religio-ethnic variables that demar-
cate Irish Protestants and Irish Catholics. Religion is not in itself important:
denomination and religiosity are insigniﬁcant. This implies that we need to
rethink some commonplace notions about the decline of religious cleavages
and the rise of ethnic-nationalist ones. In this case, secularization has virtually
no impact on an ostensibly ‘‘religious’’ association that helped maintain the
Catholic-Protestant religious cleavage. Instead, religion serves as a bound-
ary marker for an ethnic conﬂict that straddles the 1960s boundary between
‘‘old/religious’’ and ‘‘new/ethnic’’ politics periods.
Historical events are of intermediate signiﬁcance between religio-ethnic
and structural factors. Dummy variables that aggregate threatening events or
stimulating Protestant social movements were related to higher membership.
Protestant policy losses and the exigencies of war predicted lower member-
ship. Even so, events could not predict short-run changes in membership.
Moreover, much of the predictive power of the model comes from religio-
ethnic diﬀerences across county rather than time-series eﬀects. Putnam’s
generational thesis, which suggests that historical events shape the world-
views of particular generations, which in turn aﬀect associational participa-
tion levels, was not conﬁrmed by these data, though further research with
post-1971 data is required to decisively test his hypothesis.
The controversy over whether Orangeism is supported by Irish Protes-
tant descendants or by Scottish Protestants’ competition with local Roman
Catholics is diﬃcult to resolve due to multicollinearity. Yet available evi-
dence marks both as important inﬂuences and suggests that interethnic com-
petition between Protestants and Catholics was an important motive force
behind Orangeism during the period from the 1920s to the mid-1960s. As
to the debate over the enduring nature of the Catholic-Protestant division,
this article can provide no deﬁnitive answer: Orangemembership in Scotland
peaked much later than in all other Orange locations, providing evidence for
enduring social divisions, but our model suggests that post-1970membership
levels are tied more ﬁrmly to family tradition than to sectarian competition.
Finally, we consider the electoral impact of the Orange Order on Scot-
tish politics. Whether we took the county level within central Scotland or
the ward level within Glasgow as our unit of analysis, we could ﬁnd no con-
nection between Orange density and the vote during 1861–1961. This holds
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not only for the main parties but even for the Scottish Protestant League.
Many have marveled at the shadowy nature of the so-called Orange vote and
have puzzled over why the order failed to exert more inﬂuence over the Tory
Party in west central Scotland. This article clearly demonstrates that such
surprise is misplaced: the real question is how the order managed to provide
as many political ﬁgures as it did and to acquire such an aura of inﬂuence
despite possessing limited electoral clout.
Notes
I am indebted to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding the project upon
which this article is based. I also wish to thank David Leal, Peter John, and Bernhard
Kittel for reading earlier drafts.
1 The only missing year, 1908, has been interpolated linearly from adjacent years.We
would like to record our debt to Rev. Gordon McCracken, an ex-Orangeman and
former deputy grand master of the order, who painstakingly collected and scanned
in reports of proceedings from all over Scotland for the period 1860–1966, compiling
these onto CD-ROM. His assistance and advice have been invaluable, as has that of
former grand secretary Jack Ramsay and current grand secretary Donald Hatcliﬀe.
2 Kaufmann 2004. Those wishing to gain access to these data should contact the
author at Birkbeck College, University of London. Data will be released through the
U.K. Data Archive subject to the approval of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland
and the Reverend McCracken.
3 Memberships at the lodge level are not available for the Masonic Order; hence the
lack of size diﬀerentials on the map.
4 Calculated from county (Northern Ireland) and provincial (Canada) Grand Orange
Lodge reports of proceedings and return sheets and respective historical censuses.
5 I have drawn upon Michael Hechter’s (1976) ‘‘U.K. County Data, 1851–1966.’’
This comprehensive dataset encompasses variables from the census, the registrar-
general’s reports, and the elections of 1885, 1892, 1900, 1910, 1924, 1931, 1951, and
1966. Election data have been matched to their closest census years (Hechter 1975).
A second source of electronic data is Iain McLean and J. C. Gordon’s (1978) study
‘‘Labour Elites and Electorates in Glasgow, 1922–1974,’’ which provides census and
electoral data for Glasgow in the mid-twentieth century.These data have been aug-
mented by text sources where necessary.
6 Thanks to the important geographic areal interpolation work of Danny Dorling,
David Martin, and Richard Mitchell (2001) on the Linking Censuses Together
(LCT) project, we can establish a set of county-level data for the 1971–91 period that
is continuous with Hechter’s 1851–1961 set of county data. Data for 2001, though
now available using the post-1973 geography, have not been covered similarly by the
LCT program and thus cannot be used in our county-level study.
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7 No census was taken in 1941, and there are no separate data for counties of cities, so
Glasgow is included in the Lanarkshire total.
8 TSCS models gain appreciably in their power with the addition of a longer time
series.Though this involves estimating a considerable number of data points for our
independent variables, it is managed to some extent by comparing with the smaller
‘‘hard’’ data model, weighting by annual Scottish ﬁgures for population and religion,
and inserting a tracking variable to test for any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between census
and estimated data.
9 Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi-square (105) = 647.809, Pr = 0.0000
on 20 complete observations; modiﬁedWald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in
TSCS feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression model: chi-square (15)
= 92791.26; Prob > chi-square = 0.0000.
10 R2 = .7206; Prob > F = 0.0000 (based on hard census years dataset).
11 This is achieved here by using linear interpolation of explanatory variables, which
are adjusted by annual Scottish national time-series data on population. Most of the
variables considered follow a broad trajectory, such as urbanization and rise of the
Catholic and nonreligious population; hence our assumptionsmay be considered rea-
sonable. To control for any diﬀerence between estimated and hard data, we use an
estimation control dummy coded 1 for estimated data and 0 for hard data. For more
on this technique see Greene 2003: 60.
12 Variables were composed of the following events: (a) threatening events: Church
of Ireland disestablishment controversy (1868–69), Scottish papal hierarchy resto-
ration (1878), Church of Scotland disestablishment debate (1881–84), Irish Home
Rule crises (1884–86, 1890–92, 1916–22), Ne Temere decree (1907–8), Education
Act (1918), Roman Catholic Relief Act (1926), visit to pope by Church of Scot-
land moderator (1962), Northern Ireland ‘‘Troubles’’ (1969–72), Tullyvallen mas-
sacre at a Northern Ireland Orange hall (1975), ﬁrst Roman Catholic chief constable
(1977), ﬁrst papal visit (1982), and Anglo-Irish Agreement (1986); (b) policy victory:
ﬁrst Glasgow Orange parade (1872), ﬁrst two Home Rule crises’ endpoints (1886,
1892), and Roman Catholic bishop of Derry’s visit halted at Edinburgh (1975); (c)
policy losses: Church of Ireland disestablishment (1869), restoration of papal hier-
archy (1879), Irish independence (1922), aftermath of Church of Scotland mod-
erator visit (1963), Roman Catholic chief constable (1977), aftermath of papal visit
(1983), and aftermath of Anglo-Irish Agreement (1987); (d ) sociopolitical stimuli:
union of competing Orange Order branches (1877), Boer War (1899–1901), anti-
Catholic mass activities of preacher George Wise (1903–6), Orange and Protestant
political party (1923), height of John Cormack’s and Alexander Ratcliﬀe’s Protestant
parties in Edinburgh and Glasgow (1925–36), and anti-Catholic riot in Edinburgh
(1935); and (e) wartime: Boer War (1899–1901), World War I (1914–18), and World
War II (1939–45).
13 The insigniﬁcance of proportion in agriculture in model 1 is likely due to the bias
toward more recent years introduced by including the mostly recent nonzero cases
from marginal counties. Events are insigniﬁcant in the all-inclusive model, prob-
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ably due to the weakening of period eﬀects that accompanies successive zero scores
on the dependent variable. The predictive power of the model as a whole (R2) is
lower due both to the increased size of the dataset and to its greater time-series
bias.
14 It is conceivable that the Irish Protestant unit eﬀect may impact diﬀerently in par-
ticular years while historical eventsmay have diﬀerent receptions in particular places.
15 Excluding downtown lodges, based on location of lodges within wards and allocation
of membership by visual inspection. Given a certain degree of interlodge mobility
across wards as well as the diﬀering sizes of lodge catchment areas and the presence
of large city-center lodges, it is diﬃcult to specify the exact Orange membership of
each ward. I have been aided in this task by former deputy grandmasterMcCracken,
whose encyclopedic knowledge of Glasgow Orange membership patterns proved
extremely valuable.
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